The Fourth Amendment and the Legitimate Expectation of Privacy

This Article does not endeavor to engage in a debate over the efficacy or deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule.\u27 Nevertheless, it should be noted that these decisions appear questionable. It seems clear that a refusal to apply the rule in cases of particular fourth amendment transgressions will produce no incremental deterrence of unlawful police conduct, and inconsistent application of the rule arguably could diminish whatever deterrent value does exist.Therefore, if deterrence is viewed as the primary--if not only-function of the exclusionary rule, that goal should be promoted through thorough and consistent application of the rule.The Supreme Court, however, has refused to adopt this policy and instead has isolated the rule\u27s deterrent aspect as a means to circumvent the inadmissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment

Controlling Campaign Spending and the New Corruption : Waiting for the Court

Preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption are the only legitimate and compelling government interests thus far identified for restricting campaign finances.\u27 This statement by the United States Supreme Court appears to present its position on campaign finance restrictions. It must be viewed, however, in juxtaposition to other often quoted language of the Court concluding that restricting the speech of one in an effort to enhance that of another is contrary to the first amendment. These conclusions led the Court to the dichotomous holding in Buckley v. Valeo that campaign contribution restrictions contained in the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) constitutionally were permissible, but that similar limitations on independent expenditures violated first amendment free speech guarantees. The Court in Buckley defined corruption as the improper exchange of large contributions for commitments from the candidate. The Court concluded that corruption was a sufficient governmental concern and validated the contribution restrictions in FECA. It also found, however, that independent expenditures did not pose a similar risk of corruption. The Court\u27s refusal even to consider a possible governmental interest in equalizing the relative influence of speakers on elections constitutionally left sacrosanct independent expenditures. Unfortunately, Buckley and its progeny have left campaign finance even more troubled than it was prior to attempts at legislative reform. It is now more difficult for non-wealthy candidates to raise money; simultaneously, massive spending by wealthy candidates and organizations goes uncontrolled. Unregulated expenditures not only have increased the cost of running for office, but also have fueled the political action committee (PAC) phenomenon.\u27 Limits on the amount of contributions and the impracticality of individual expenditures on behalf of candidates have made the lure of PACs as effective campaign spenders even more attractive